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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the district court was correct in holding that one cannot obtain

property from the County through either adverse possession or the related doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence.
II.

Whether the district court was correct in holding that a strip of land owned

by the public could not be vacated or abandoned through disuse alone?
III.

Whether the district court was correct in ruling that Jamie Fries was entitled

to ownership in the alleyway, where Jamie Fries' predecessor in interest owned the real
property from which the entire alley came, where Ms. Fries predecessor in interest had
dedicated the alley for public use, where Ms. Fries predecessor in interest platted the
alley as part of the Highland Subdivision, and where Ms. Fries' lot is in the Highland
Subdivision while Ms. Myers' lot is not.
IV.

Whether the district court was correct in ruling that there were no genuine

issues of material fact.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-807 (2000) [now § 10-9a-607(l)]:
(1)
Plats, when made, acknowledged, and recorded according to the
procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets and
other public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the
municipality for the public for the uses named or intended in those plats
(2)
The dedication established by this section does not impose liability
upon the municipality for streets and other public places that are dedicated
in the manner but unimproved.

1

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105 (1998):
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having
jurisdiction over any highway, or by other competent authority.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13 (1953):
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof,
designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public
squares, or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession for any
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a
valuable consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent to
such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in interest, have
been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The disputed tract of land in this case is the portion of an alley that runs between
the parties' property (hereinafter, the "alley" or "alleyway"). Prior to 1916, Ms. Fries'
predecessor in interest owned the land (now known as the "Highland Subdivision") that
included the alley. In 1916, Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest dedicated the alley to the
public, and divided the Highland Subdivision into individual lots. In the year 2000, Salt
Lake County vacated the alley. A dispute between the parties arose over who owned the
alley. Ms. Myers asserted ownership on the grounds that she had been possessing the
alley and had therefore adversely possessed the alley from the County. Ms. Fries asserted
ownership on the grounds that the alley was part of the Highland subdivision (which Ms.
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Fries lot was in and Ms. Myers lot was not), and because Ms. Fries predecessor in interest
owned the property and was the one that had dedicated the alley to the public.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court

On April 7, 2004, Ms. Fries filed her Complaint, seeking an order quieting title in
her name to the alley. On September 13, 2004, Ms. Fries moved for Summary Judgment.
On December 6, 2004, the district court heard Ms. Fries Motion for Summary Judgment.
At the hearing, the district court accepted all of Ms. Myers' facts as true, but held that
they made no difference. Specifically, the district court held that the only way the alley
could cease to be the property of the County was by formal vacation, and that there could
be no adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence against the County regardless of
whether the entire alley had been fenced off for fifty years or even more. The district
court ruled that Ms. Fries was the rightful owner. On January 4, 2005, Judge Anthony B.
Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Ms.
Fries. Ms Myers filed her notice of appeal on January 5, 2005.
C.

Statement of Relevant Facts

1.

Ms. Fries owns real property located in Magna, Utah (3036 South 9050),

identified as lots 9, 10, and 11, section 257, of Salt Lake County's Plat Map,ffice Book G
of Plats, Page 67. (R. at 4.; a copy of said plat is attached as Exhibit A and enlarged copy
of portion of plat as Exhibit B.)
2.

Ms. Myers owns real property to the west of Ms. Fries (9100 West, Magna,

Utah), identifies as lot 004, section 257, of Salt Lake County's Plat Map, Office Book G
of Plats, Page 67. (R. at 4, 58; Exhibit A and B.)
3

3.

Between the parties' property lays a twelve foot wide alley that runs north

and south from 3000 South to 3100 South at 9075 West. (R. at 5, 6, 9,11; Exhibit A and
B).
4.

Prior to 1916, Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest owned land (now known as

the "Highland Subdivision") that included the alley. In 1916, Ms. Fries' predecessor in
interest dedicated the alley to the public, and divided the Highland Subdivision into
individual lots. (R. at 89; a copy, reduced in size, of portions of the Highland
Subdivision Dedication are attached as Exhibit C).
5.

The entire alley remained in the Highland subdivision. (R. at 5, 89, 95;

Exhibit A, and B.)
6.

Ms. Fries' lot is in the Highland subdivision while Ms. Myers' lot is not.

(R. at 5, 89, 95; Exhibit A, and B.)
7.

On September 18, 2000, Salt Lake County vacated the alley by ordinance

no. 1467. (R. at 11-16; A copy of the Ordinance is attached as Exhibit D.)
8.

The Salt Lake County tax assessor added the alley to the lot owners on the

east side of the alley (i.e., those lots within the Highland Subdivision, including Ms. Fries
lot), and did not add the portion to the lot owners on the west side of the alley (i.e., those
lots not within the Highland Subdivision, including Ms. Myers' lot). (R. at 90, 102, 106.)
9.

Despite Salt Lake County's ordinance, and Salt Lake County Tax

assessment, Appellant Ms. Myers refused to vacate the alley. Instead, she claimed she
had been possessing the alley and was therefore the rightful owner by adverse possession.
(R. at 24-30.)
4

10.

On April 7, 2004, Ms. Fries filed a Complaint, seeking an order quieting

title in her name to the alley. As part of her Complaint, Ms. Fries asserted ownership on
the grounds that her predecessor in interest owned the property and was the one that had
dedicated the alley to the public, and because the alley was platted as part of the Highland
subdivision (which Ms. Fries lot was in and Ms. Myers lot was not). (R. at 1-2.)
11.

On September 13, 2004, Ms. Fries moved for Summary Judgment (R. at

31) claiming that Ms. Myers could not adversely possess property from the County prior
to 2000, and that not enough time had passed to allow Ms. Myers to adversely possess the
property against Ms. Fries. (R. at 31, 91-92.)
12.

On December 6, 2004, the district court heard Ms. Fries Motion for

Summary Judgment. For purposes of summary judgment, the district court accepted all
of Ms. Myers' facts as true including her claim that the entire alley had been fenced off
and was part of the defendant's properties for a long period of time, at least since the
1950s. (R. at 248, Transcr. Hrg. 33:25, 34:10-13.)
13.

The district court held that Ms. Myers' facts made no difference because

the law was clear that the County could only vacate the property by formal vacation, and
that Ms. Myers could not obtain ownership by adversely possessing property against the
County. Since Ms. Fries predecessor in interest had owned the entire alley, and had
platted all of it as part of the Highland subdivision, Ms. Fries was the rightful owner. (R.
at 248, Transcr. Hrg. 32:23-25, 33:1-13.)
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14.

On January 4, 2005, Judge Anthony B. Quinn entered an order granting Ms.

Fries' Motion for Summary Judgment and quieting title to the alley to Ms. Fries. (R. at
216-17.)
15.

On January 5, 2005, Ms. Myers filed her Notice of Appeal. (R. at 219-21.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The district court was correct in ruling, on summary judgment, that Ms. Myers
could not have acquired the alley through adverse possession or boundary by
acquiescence. The law is clear that one cannot adversely possess property from the state.
Ms. Myers' argument that she and her predecessors have been in open, notorious, and
adverse possession of the alley are therefore irrelevant.
The alley could not cease to be property of the County except by formal vacation.
Ms. Myers argument that the County abandoned the property over fifty years ago is also
without merit because the County did not formerly vacate the property until September
18,2000.
Ms. Fries is entitled to ownership of the entire alley that abutted her property
because her predecessor in interest owned the alley, and the alley was dedicated as part of
Ms. Fries' subdivision. By operation of law, the alley reverted back to the original
owner's successor in interest. Ms. Myer's argument that the alley should be split XA is
without merit because § 72-5-105(2)(a), which Ms. Myers relies upon, was not in effect
until 2002 (two years after the county's vacation). Furthermore, § 72-5-105(2)(b)
provides for exclusive ownership when an owner of record is known. In this case, the
undisputed evidence showed that Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest owned the alley.
6

Property vacated by the County should therefore be awarded to the original owner's
successors in interest. Ms. Myers predecessor in interest did not own the alley, and her
lot was not platted as part of the Highland Subdivision that included the alley. Thus, Ms.
Myers had no claim of ownership in the vacated alley.
The district court was correct in holding that there were no genuine issues of
material fact. Facts about the County abandoning the alley are irrelevant because the
County cannot cease its ownership right except by formal vacation. Facts about
acquiring the alley through adverse possession are similarly irrelevant because one
cannot adversely possess property from the County. Thus, the district court's order
granting summary judgment was correct and should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT MS.
MYERS COULD NOT HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THROUGH
ADVERSE POSSESSION OR BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE
A.

One cannot adversely possess property from the County.

The Appellant's claim that the County abandoned the property is wholly without
merit. The unambiguous language of the Utah Code provides:
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by
any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public
use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other
public purpose, by adverse possession for any length of time whatsoever, unless it
shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or county or the corporate
authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real
estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that for more than seven
years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in
interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such
real estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired. Utah Code Ann. § 7812-13(1953).
7

In this case, there is no evidence given by the Appellant that the County sold, or
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable
consideration.
In Nyman v. Anchor Development, 73 P.3d 357, 360 (Utah 2003), the appellant
requested quiet title to a strip of land (vacated by the state) because his garage (for which
he paid taxes) had been on the strip of land for twenty-four years. However, the Supreme
Court of Utah rejected his argument because one may not adverse the sovereign. See also
Cassity v. Castagno, 347 P. 2d 834 (Utah 1959); Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33
(Utah 1908). Because one cannot obtain property from the state through fences, or
occupancy, the Nyman Court rejected the appellant's claim to ownership and affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment.
Similarly, in this case, Ms. Myers is trying to claim ownership of the property
through the establishment offences or other boundary devices. Since one may not
adverse the sovereign, Ms. Myers has no claim to ownership through adverse possession.
B.
One cannot acquire ownership against the County through boundary
by acquiescence.
Ms. Myers has also asserted ownership through boundary by acquiescence. (See
Brief of Appellant 10, fn. 2.) Much like the related doctrine of adverse possession, one
cannot obtain property from the County through boundary by acquiescence. The
Supreme Court of Utah held that parties separated by a strip of land (i.e., a street or
alley) once owned by the county could not claim boundary by acquiescence on any
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portion of that vacated strip of land because the parties had no contiguity. Condas v.
Willesen, 61A P.2d 115 (Utah 1983). In Condas,
The appellants and respondents own land in Salt Lake County, which until 1980
was separated by a 33-foot strip of land. The 33-foot strip had been dedicated as a
street (St. Johns Street) in 1908 by respondents' predecessors in interest. The
street was never actually built, and Salt Lake County passed an ordinance vacating
its ownership of the property in 1980. From approximately 1929 until 1979, a
fence was located along the eastern edge of St. Johns Street. Appellants and their
predecessors in interest occupied the land west of the fence, including St. Johns
Street itself, and respondents and their predecessors in interest occupied the land
east of the fence. M a t 674. (Emphasis added).
Essentially, the Condas appellants were claiming that since they had a fence,
occupied, and used the strip of land for fifty years, they should be entitled to the property.
The Supreme Court rejected their argument:
The appellants contend that they have acquired equitable title to the disputed strip
of property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. From at least 1929
until 1979, they or their predecessors in interest occupied and used the property in
question. The undisputed facts show that St. Johns Street separated the property
owned by the appellants from that owned by respondents throughout the period
which appellants claim to have established a boundary by acquiescence. During
that period of time, Salt Lake County was the fee simple owner of the dedicated
property. U.C.A., 1953, § 57-5-4. // is therefore obvious that one of the essential
requirements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence—that the parties be
'adjoining' landowners—has not been met in this case. Without contiguity there
can be no boundary by acquiescence. Smith v. DeNiro, 25 Utah 2d 295, 296, 480
P. 2d 480,481 (1971) (footnote omitted). Appellants' contentions therefore fail
and the [summary] judgment of the district court was correct. I(L Emphasis
added.
The rationale preventing adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence both
stem from the same doctrine, namely the "'ancient doctrine' of nullum tempus occurrit
regi, or 'time does not run against the king.' Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A. 2d 199,
201-02 (N.J. 1991) (explaining the doctrine's rationale that 'the king was too busy
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protecting the interests of his people to keep track of his lands and to bring suits to
protect them in a timely fashion')." Nyman v. Anchor Development, 73 P.3d 357, 360
(Utah 2003).

II.

THE ALLEY COULD CEASE TO BE PROPERTY OF THE COUNTY
ONLY BY FORMAL VACATION
The County (or any other sovereign entity) abandons property only by formal

vacation. See e.g., Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 (Utah 1974); Henderson v.
Osguthorpe, 756 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1982); Condas v. Willesen, 674 P.2d 115 (Utah 1983);
Hallv. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304, 166 P.2d 221 (Utah 1946); Nyman v. Anchor
Development, 73 P.3d 357, 360 (Utah 2003); Cassity v. Castagno, 347 P. 2d 834 (Utah
1959); Lundv. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33 (Utah 1908); Devins v. Borough of Bogota,
592 A. 2d 199, 201-02 (N.J. 1991).
The foregoing cases dealt with public property that had substantial periods of nonuse by the public (some of them had no use at all), but they all came out the same way;
namely, property is not abandoned by the state through non-use—only by written order or
declaration.
Ercanbrack, laid out the rule that a public roadway could not be abandoned or
vacated by even decades of disuse, but only by written declaration. Id. at 597. Appellant
argues that Ercanbrack only applies to property established by "use" from the
government, and not by "dedication." However, Ercanbrack placed no special
distinction on such grounds, and is a distinction made only by Appellant Ms. Myers.
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Henderson eliminates the guess work of whether Ms. Myers' distinction of "use"
versus "dedication" is significant. In Henderson, the property was "dedicated" as a Salt
Lake County roadway, but the property "has never been developed as road and remains
essentially in its natural state, covered by trees and shrubs." Id. at 1268 (Emphasis
added). Despite the fact that the Henderson road had been dedicated for public use and
never developed, the court still applied the Ercanbrack rule: "the legislature expressed its
clear intention not to provide for automatic forfeiture of publicly owned roadways
through nonuse alone." Henderson at 1269. In other words, Ms. Myers' distinction of
"use" versus "dedication" is irrelevant. Moreover, the facts in this case are similar to
Henderson. The alley in this case was dedicated for public use and had a substantial
period of non-use. As such, this court should follow the same rule as Henderson.
In another example, adjoining property owners had fenced off a street shown on a
township plat for more than seventy years before the city decided to open the street. The
Court held that the right to use the street had not been lost, even after seventy-five years
of non-use, and that the street could be opened. Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304,
166P.2d221 (Utah 1946).
Appellant Ms. Myers relies heavily on Falula Farms v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569
(Utah 1993), but draws incorrect conclusions about its holdings. Ms. Myers incorrectly
asserts that if the alley is a defeasible fee, Ms. Fries is not entitled to the alley. Falula
Farms does not make this holding. The holding in Falula Farms was that the state could
not choose itself who to give vacated property, but can only vacate and revoke its original
acceptance so that the property reverts back to the original property owners. The reason
11

Falula Farms emphasized the defeasible fee was because Falula Farms argued that if the
county did have a fee simple, it could deed the property to whomever it chose. However,
the court held that the quit claim deed could only serve to revoke its acceptance thereof,
and that the alley would then revert back to the original owners of the land. Id. at 572. In
Falula Farms, the roadway was not given up through any inaction of the county, but was
only vacated as a result of a pro-active action: a written quit claim deed from the county.
Id. at 573. The court stated that if the road was no longer used by the public, it created a
condition whereby "it may be abandoned," but does not actually trigger the abandonment
itself. Id. at 572. The triggering mechanism in Falula Farms was the quit claim deed
from the county. In essence, the holding of Falula Farms does not diminish the
Ercanbrack requirement of a written formal declaration of vacation.
Since the quit claim deed in Falula Farms could only divest the county of its
interest, the Falula Farms court had to decide who the property should revert to. The
Court held that the property should revert to the lot purchasers, not the developer.
The reason vacated roadways go to the lot purchasers (and not the developer) is
because it is presumed the sale of the lot automatically includes the reversionary interest
of any public roadway. See, e.g., Weldon v. Heron, 78 N.M. 427, 428,432 P.2d 392, 393
(1967).
In this case, Salt Lake County's September 18, 2000 written ordinance vacating
the alley caused the alley to revert back to the original owner's successors in interest just
as the written quit claim did the roadway in Falula Farms. Without a written declaration,
the alley would have not been vacated.
12

III. WHEN THE ALLEY WAS VACATED ON SEPTEMBER 18, 2000, THE
PORTION OF THE ALLEY THAT ABUTTED MS. FRIES' PROPERTY
AUTOMATICALLY REVERTED BACK TO HER
Ms. Fries is entitled to ownership of the entire alley that abutted her property
because her predecessor in interest owned the alley, and the alley was dedicated as part of
Ms. Fries' subdivision. The county ordinance vacating the alley stated, "All right, title
and interest in and to the portion of said alley being vacated is to revert by operation of
law to the abutting property owner or owners." See Exhibit D.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "revert" as follows:
Revert. To turn back, to return to. With respect to property, to go back to and
lodge in former owner, who parted with it by creating estate in another which has
expired, or to his heirs. As used in a deed, connotes an undisposed of residue and
imports that property is to return to a person who formerly owned it, but who
parted with the possession or title by creating an estate in another person which
has terminated by his act or by operation of law. Black's Law Dictionary 916
(Abridged 6th ed., West 1991).
In Condas v. Willesen, 61A P.2d 115 (Utah 1983), the Appellee was the successor
in interest to the roadway; as such, the Appellant did not even argue for a XA split. Once
the court rejected Appellants argument of ownership by boundary by acquiescence, the
court affirmed summary judgment that had quieted title of the entire roadway to the
Appellee.
Other states follow the rule that the entire roadway goes to one party so long as
there is a record of the initial holder of title. State v. Mobile River Telephone Company,
898 So.2d 763 (Ala. Ct App. 2004). Ms. Myers tries to distinguish this case on the
grounds that Ms. Fries did not personally own all of the alley when the alley was
originally platted. This does not distinguish the case because neither did the property
13

owners in Mobile River. The Mobile River appellant's predecessor in interest owned the
land that included the entire roadway. As a successor in interest to the original owner,
the Mobile River appellant was entitled to the entire alleyway, and not just half. Id. at
773-74.
Mobile River further stated, "It is a fundamental concept in American
Jurisprudence that a grantee or successor in title cannot obtain more by conveyance than
the grantor or their predecessor in title possessed." Id. at 768. The court went on to
explain that it would be "inequitable fiction" to split a vacated highway in half when the
plaintiff could indisputably show that plaintiffs predecessor in interest was one who
originally owned and platted the highway for public use. Id. at 773.
In another illustrative case, Neil v. Independent Realty Co., 317 Mo. 1235, 1244,
298 S.W. 363, 366 (1927), the plaintiffs' predecessor purchased four contiguous lots on
the northern side of a subdivision, while defendants' predecessor had purchased four lots
on the southern side. Later, plaintiffs' predecessor re-subdivided the northern half of the
original subdivision and laid out a 25 foot wide street as the southernmost edge of the
subdivision. In other words, the street had been taken from the northern lots. The City
later vacated the street, and the defendants claimed ownership of half of the roadway, or
12.5 feet. The trial court granted the entire 25 feet to the plaintiffs, and the Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
In this case, the undisputed facts show that Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest
originally platted the alley.
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Appellant Ms. Myers argues that the roadway should be split Vi between the
parties and relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105(2) (2002) for her proposition:
(a)
For purposes of assessment, upon the recordation of an order executed by
the proper authority with the county recorder's office, title to the vacated or
abandoned highway, street, or road shall vest to the adjoining record owners, with
1/2 of the width of the highway, street, or road assessed to each of the adjoining
owners.
(b)
Provided, however, that should a description of an owner of record extend
into the vacated or abandoned highway, street, or road that portion of the vacated
or abandoned highway, street, or road shall vest in the record owner, with the
remainder of the highway, street, or road vested as otherwise provided in this
Subsection (2).
There are two problems with Appellant's argument. First, subsection (2) was not
codified until 2002. Since the alley was vacated in 2000, subsection (2) does not even
apply. The alley reverted to the abutting land owners in 2000, not 2002.
Second, even if subsection (2)(a) did apply, subsection (2)(b) explicitly provides
an exception to the XA split when the record holder of the original roadway is known. In
this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Papinokolas was the original record holder. It is
undisputed that Ms. Fries is a successor in interest to Mr. Papinokolas. It is undisputed
that the alley was platted as part of the Highland Subdivision, where Ms. Mries lot is
located and Ms. Myers lot is not. As such, when the County vacated the alley in 2000,
Ms. Fries became the rightful owner of the portion of the alley that abuts her property.
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IV.

BECAUSE THE COUNTY COULD NOT CEASE ITS OWNERSHIP
EXCEPT BY FORMAL VACATION, AND BECAUSE ONE CANNOT
ADVERSELY POSSESS AGAINST THE SOVEREIGN, THERE WERE
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
The Defendant could not begin to adversely possess the property before

September 18, 2000 (the date the county vacated the alley). Whether fence lines had
been in place for at least 40 years was immaterial. Facts about the county abandoning the
alley were also irrelevant because the county cannot cease its ownership right except by
formal vacation.
Ms. Myers initially made some argument about whether Ms. Fries' undisputed
publicly known facts had been authenticated. Once all the publicly known facts were
authenticated, Ms. Myers dropped this argument. Ms. Myers seems to have resurfaced
this argument in her Appellate Brief. This argument remains without merit because the
facts are publicly known and have been authenticated. (R. at 89, 93-115.)
Accordingly, because there were no genuine issues of any material facts, the
district court was correct in granting summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. One cannot adversely possess
property from the County, and the County does not cease ownership of property except
by formal vacation. There are no genuine issues of material fact. Any facts that might be
material have been authenticated and are public record. Ms. Myers' facts about exclusive
possession are immaterial because one cannot adversely possess property from the
County, and not enough time had passed to allow Ms. Myers to adversely possess against
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Ms. Fries. Thus, the district court was correct in granting Appellee summary judgment as
a matter of law, and this Court should affirm the district court's order granting summary
judgment.
Dated this H^day

of M

_, 2006.

U^f^t

DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C.

JEFFREY L^CITC^EN
Attorney fbr Appellee/Respondent,
Jamie Fries
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AN ORDINANCE VACATING AN ALLEY BETWEEN 3000 SOUTH AND 3100 SOUTH AT
9075 WEST IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH.
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as follows:
SECTION 1 ( 1 )

A 12 foot wide by 725 foot long alley, located approximately

between 3000 South and 3100 South at 9075 West, and which is more fully described in Exhibit
A attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein, is hereby vacated.
(2)

This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of County Commissioners

following a hearing on June 7,2000, that due and proper notice of the hearing to vacate said alley
was duly given according to law and that no objection was made to said proposed vacation. The
Board further finds that the County has no present or future need for the alley vacated herein, and
that vacation of the alley relieves the County from present or future obligations to maintain such
alley, Therefore, no appraisal nor compensation to the County is required.
(3)

All right, title and interest in and to the portion of said alley being vacated is to

revert by operation of law to the abutting property owner or owners. This ordinance shall have
no force or effect to impair any easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing
public franchises, water drainage easements, or other such easements, as presently exist under,
over, or upon the vacated portion of said alley, or as are or may be shown on the official plats
and records of the County.
(4)

The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to record this ordinance and

make the necessary changes on the official plats and records of the County to reflect said
ordinance.
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SECTION II. This ordinance shall become effective 15 days after the date of its
enactment and upon one publication in a newspaper in and having general circulation in Salt
Lake County.
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2000.
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EXHIBIT
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A"

Said parcel of land situated in the Southwest quarter, of
the Northeast Quarter of Section 30, Township 1 S, Range 2 W, Salt
Lake Base & Meridian, described as follows:
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of HIGHLAND
SUBDIVISION OF MAGNA as recorded as entry
#3 60562 in Book G of plats Page 61 and running
thence N 89°00'E 12.0 feet to the Northwest
Corner of Lot 1, Block 4 of said Subdivision;
thence S 0°55'E 725.0 along the East Line of
the Alley to the Southwest Corner of Lot 29,
Block 4 of said Subdivision; thence S 89d 00 'W
12.0 feet to the Southwest Corner of said
Subdivision; thence N 0°55'W 725 feet to the
point of beginning.
Area equals 8700 sg. ft. or 0.1997 acres.
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AN ORDINANCE VACATING AN ALLEY BETWEEN 3000 SOUTH AND 3100 SOUTH AT
9075 WEST IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH.
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as follows:
SECTION I

(1)

A 12 foot wide by 725 foot long alley, located approximately

between 3000 South and 3100 South at 9075 West, and which is more fully described in Exhibit
A attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein, is hereby vacated.
(2)

This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of County Commissioners

following a hearing on June 7,2000, that due and proper notice of the hearing to vacate said alley
was duly given according to law and that no objection was made to said proposed vacation. The
Board further finds that the County has no present or future need for the alley vacated herein, and
that vacation of the alley relieves the County from present or future obligations to maintain such
alley, Therefore, no appraisal nor compensation to the County is required.
(3)

All right, title and interest in and to the portion of said alley being vacated is to

revert by operation of law to the abutting property owner or owners. This ordinance shall have
no force or effect to impair any easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing
public franchises, water drainage easements, or other such easements, as presently exist under,
over, or upon the vacated portion of said alley, or as are or may be shown on the official plats
and records of the County.
(4)

The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to record this ordinance and
CD

make the necessary changes on the official plats and records of the County to reflect said

ordinance.
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SECTION II. This ordinance shall become effective 15 days after the date of its
enactment and upon one publication in a newspaper in and having general circulation in Salt
Lake County.
APPROVED and PASSED this
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2000.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
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EXHIBIT
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A"

Said parcel of land situated in the Southwest quarter, of
the Northeast Quarter of Section 30, Township 1 S, Range 2 W, Salt
Lake Base & Meridian, described as follows:
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of HIGHLAND
SUBDIVISION OF MAGNA as recorded as entry
#3 60562 in Book G of plats Page 67 and running
thence N 89°00'E 12.0 feet to the Northwest
Corner of Lot 1, Block 4 of said Subdivision;
thence S '0°55'E 725.0 along the East Line of
the Alley to the Southwest Corner of Lot 29,
Block 4 of said Subdivision; thence S 89d 00 'W
12.0 feet to the Southwest Corner of said
Subdivision; thence N 0°55'W 725 feet to the
point of beginning.
Area equals 8700 sg. ft. or 0.1997 acres.
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